

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 DODE-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00

H-03 INR-11 IO-14 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04

PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15

TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-07 DRC-01 AECE-00 /153 W

----- 080819

P R 021451Z AUG 74

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4170

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY ROME

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 12237

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, GW

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: FRG FOREIGN OFFICE VIEWS

BEGIN SUMMARY: FRG FONOFF OFFICIAL IN AN INFORMAL DISCUSSION EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE NUCLEAR ELEMENT MIGHT BE INTRODUCED INTO THE NEXT ROUND OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT DUE PRIOR CONSULTATIONS. THE GERMAN VIEW THAT THE OPTION III NUCLEAR ELEMENTS SHOULD BE
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INTRODUCED INDIVIDUALLY RATHER THAN AS A PACKAGE WAS

RESTATED. OPTION III SHOULD NOT BE EXPENDED SOLELY TO OBTAIN THE REDUCTION OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY IN PHASE I. THE FONOFF OFFICIAL IS NOT SANGUINE ABOUT EVEN TOKEN BUNDESWEHR REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST PHASE AND BELIEVES SUCH A REDUCTION WOULD BE OF EVEN MORE CONCERN TO THE FRG THAN THE POSSIBILITY OF INTRODUCING OPTION III INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS. NO GAIN IS SEEN FROM BROADENING THE CURRENT WESTERN CONCEPT OF THE COMMON CEILING TO INCLUDE AIR FORCE MANPOWER. THE FONOFF OFFICIAL BELIEVES THAT DISCUSSION OF PROSPECTIVE REDUCTION SLICES AMONG THE WESTERN ALLIES IS A DANGEROUS BUSINESS AND COULD POSSIBLY BE DIVISIVE. THE FONOFF PREFERS TO REMAIN WITHIN THE CURRENT NATO GUIDELINES THAT WESTERN REDUCTIONS NOT EXCEED 10 PERCENT. THE GERMANS FORESEE NO GREAT PROGRESS IN THE OFFING IN THE NEXT ROUND, NOR IS THERE ANY GREAT PRESSURE ON THE FRG TO MOVE AHEAD MORE QUICKLY. END SUMMARY

1. EMBOFF MET AUGUST 1 WITH FONOFF MBFR DEPT DEPUTY DIRECTOR DR. GESCHER AND DR. MASSMANN OF THE SAME OFFICE FOR AN INFORMAL DISCUSSION OF CURRENT GERMAN THINKING DURING THE PAUSE BETWEEN MBFR ROUNDS. OFFICE DIRECTOR RUTH WAS AWAY ON AN EXTENDED HOLIDAY. GESCHER EMPHASIZED THAT THE VIEWS HE EXPRESSED SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS "WORKING LEVEL" RATHER THAN AS FINISHED FRG POSITION.

2. IN DISCUSSING THE POSSIBLE INTRODUCTION OF A NUCLEAR ELEMENT INTO THE NEXT ROUND, GESCHER VOICED THE OPINION THAT THE SOVIETS OBVIOUSLY HAVE A LARGE INTEREST IN THE NUCLEAR QUESTION, BUT THAT PERHAPS A MORE OVERRIDING CONCERN IS TO SECURE A VOICE IN FUTURE EUROPEAN UNITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION QUESTIONS. GESCHER POINTED OUT THAT THE FRG WILL WAIT FOR AN AMERICAN LEAD ON WHETHER THE NUCLEAR ELEMENT SHOULD BE INTRODUCED INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE FRG WOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE NUCLEAR ELEMENT PRIOR TO WASHINGTON TAKING ANY FINAL DECISIONS. GESCHER SEES NO REAL NEED FOR ANOTHER TRILATERAL MEETING AT THIS POINT, BUT EMPHASIZED THE FRG SECRET

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WOULD WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY FOR ANOTHER TRILATERAL PRIOR TO THE USG TAKING FINAL DECISIONS ON THIS MATTER. AS FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF THE CONTENTS OF OPTION III, GESCHER REITERATED THE PREVIOUSLY KNOWN GERMAN POSITION, I.E., NUCLEAR ELEMENTS SHOULD BE INTRODUCED ONE AT A TIME. HE CAUTIONED AGAINST EXPENDING THE WEST'S NUCLEAR "POWDER" IN MBFR I. GESCHER REPEATED THE THEME HEARD IN THE FRG DEFENSE MINISTRY ON JULY 30 (BONN 12135) THAT

OPTION III SHOULD NOT BE USED MERELY TO SECURE THE
REDUCTION OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY IN PHASE I.

3. GESCHER WAS LOATHE TO CONSIDER BUNDESWEHR REDUCTIONS -
EVEN TOKEN ONES - TAKING PLACE IN PHASE I. HE EMPHASIZED
THAT POSSIBLE PHASE II BUNDESWEHR REDUCTIONS MUST NOT BE
PREJUDICED BY THE RESULTS OBTAINED IN PHASE I. THE TWO
PRINCIPAL FONOFF BETES NOIRES ARE
BUNDESWEHR REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I AND THE INTRODUCTION
OF A WESTERN NUCLEAR ELEMENT. GESCHER STRESSED THAT
BUNDESWEHR REDUCTIONS ARE EVEN MORE OF AN ANATHEMA THAN
THE POSSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS AS IN OPTION III.

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4. GESCHER PROFESSED NOT TO SEE MUCH POINT IN CONSIDERING THE INCLUSION OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE COMMON CEILING. INCLUSION OF SUCH PERSONNEL WOULD NOT AFFECT THE FUNDAMENTAL DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES WHICH IS VIEWED BY THE FRG AS THE PRINCIPAL THREAT.

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5. GESCHER BELIEVES IT IS INCUMBENT ON THE WESTERN SIDE TO CONVINCE THE WARSAW PACT NATIONS TO EXCHANGE DATA. HE DOES NOT BELIEVE ANY WESTERN INTEREST WOULD BE SERVED BY PRESENTING NEW DATA TO THE EAST NOW. MOREOVER, A NEW EXCHANGE OF DATA SHOULD ALSO LEAD TO EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON CEILING. GESCHER BELIEVES DATA DISCUSSIONS WHICH WOULD TEND TO LEAD NATO AWAY FROM THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT AND INTO A DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC NUMBERS FOR REDUCTION AMONG THE ALLIES IS DANGEROUS. A NUMBERS GAME WOULD NOT BE IN NATO'S INTEREST. ALLIED NATIONS WOULD BE PLACED ARBITRARILY UNDER REDUCTION PRESSURES AND, SHOULD WORD LEAK OUT THAT WESTERN NATIONS WERE CONSIDERING SPECIFIC REDUCTION NUMBERS, ADDITIONAL PRESSURE COULD BE ANTICIPATED FROM CONGRESS AND THE EASTERN SIDE. GESCHER BELIEVES IT IS FAR BETTER TO FOREGO SUCH A POSSIBLY DIVISIVE DISCUSSION WITHIN NATO AT THIS TIME.

6. ON THE QUESTION OF THE SIZE OF THE COMMON CEILING, GESCHER REFERRED TO THE RECENT REPORT BY THE MBFR WORKING GROUP IN BRUSSELS IN WHICH THE COMMON CEILING ROSE TO 712,000 IN VIEW OF THE NEW NATO FORCE LEVEL DATA. THE 712,000 FIGURE DID NOT CAUSE GESCHER ANY PROBLEMS, SINCE HIS VIEW IS THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD STAY WITHIN THE NATO GUIDELINES BY NOT REDUCING FORCES MORE THAN 10 PERCENT. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE 700,000 FIGURE WAS ILLUSTRATIVE ONLY, AND WE SHOULD AVOID BECOMING WEDDED TO A NUMBER JUST BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN USED AT ONE POINT IN TIME.

7. AS FOR THE FOURTH ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS, GESCHER MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE FONOFF WAS IN NO HURRY. GESCHER SAID HE BELIEVES HIS AUTHORITIES PREFER TO CONTINUE WITH A CAREFUL, STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH. NOR DO THE GERMANS

EXPECT THAT ANY UNUSUAL PROGRESS WILL BE MADE IN THE NEXT ROUND. GESCHER REFERRED TO THE WEAKNESS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, THE WATERGATE AFFAIR AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT THERE MAY BE SOME MOVEMENT BY THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TOWARDS POLITICAL UNITY AND MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE FALL. FOR ALL OF THE ABOVE REASONS, THE FONOFF WELCOMES THE CHANCE TO GAIN ADDITIONAL TIME
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THIS FALL. ALSO, THERE IS NO INTERNAL POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE FRG TO SHOW PROGRESS IN MBFR AS THERE IS IN THE UNITED STATES. GESCHER POINTED OUT THAT THE OPPOSITION IN GERMANY TENDS TO ACT AS A BRAKE ON FORWARD MOVEMENT IN MBFR.

8. THE FONOFF MBFR DEPARTMENT IS NOT PRESENTLY PREPARING A POSITION PAPER ON MBFR ISSUES. RATHER, IT WOULD PREFER TO HAVE INDICATIONS OF THE LATEST THINKING IN WASHINGTON SINCE ANY FRG PAPER WHICH DID NOT TAKE THE AMERICAN POSITION INTO ACCOUNT WOULD BE USELESS. THE MBFR DEPARTMENT PLANS TO PREPARE A SHORT PAPER FOR AMBASSADOR ROTH PRIOR TO HIS FORTHCOMING TRIP TO WASHINGTON IN LATE AUGUST OR EARLY SEPTEMBER. ANY COMMENTS WHICH THE DEPARTMENT MIGHT WISH TO OFFER THE FONOFF ON THE TOPICS DESCRIBED IN THIS TELEGRAM WOULD BE MOST WELCOME.
HILLENBRAND

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